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NOTE
THE RISE OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING:
A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS OF LANDOWNER
DECISION-MAKING
Jared B. Fish*
High volume "slickivater" horizontal hydraulic fracturing
("hydrofracking" or 'fracking") is an innovative technology nov widely
used to extract natural gas from shale rock. Proponents hail fracking
as a way to promote energy independence, bring jobs to economically
distressed communities, and mitigate climate change by switching from
oil and coal to naturalgas. Yet the process has come under increased
public scrutiny in recent years as thousands qf reports surfaced linking
hydrofracking to groundwatercontamination, airpollution, and various
maladies. Despite an explosion qf media reports on the potential risks
associated with fracking, landowners continue to lease their mineral
rights to naturalgas companies on a large scale. The number of iells in
Pennsylvaniaalone - a state that sits atop the gas-rich Marcellus shale
formation - is expected to risefrom 3, 000 in 2010 to 60, 000 by 2030.
This paperanalyzes landowner incentives that encourage leasing
even in the face qfpotentially serious risks. I conduct the analysisthrough
a behaviorallens, andposit that enthusiasmfor leasingresults from three
factors: (1) a failure to perceive long-term risks due to asymmetrical
information between landovners and industry (2) a prisoner&dilemma
resulting largelyfrom evolving nuisance and trespass jurisprudence that
strengthens mineral extractors 'rights, and (3) an inadequate regulatory
environment that leaves few places off-limits tofracking.
States, andperhaps the federalgovernment, must strengthen laws
and regulationsgoverningfracking to bridge asymmetries in information
and power Before government can promulgate appropriateregulations,
howtever more research is needed to understandfracking full health and
environmentalrisks. Until then, the precautionar}principleshouldgovern
the expansion ofa potentially promising technology.
*Jared Fish graduated from the University of California at Berkeley in 2011,
where he developed an interest in pursuing a career in environmental law. Mr.
Fish is particularly interested in clean energy development, natural resource man-

agement, and water law. Mr. Fish would like to thank Professor Michelle Wilde
Anderson, whose thoughtful and rigorous feedback was critical to the outcome of
the piece.
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INTRODUCTION
Public enthusiasm for resource extraction has historically
been balanced by demands for strong regulatory oversight. Public
outrage over the toxic waste dump at Love Canal in New York led
to the passage of the Comprehensive Environental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") in 1980,1 which
created a national hazardous waste management program. The
Exxon-Valdez oil tanker disaster of 1989 led to enactment of the
Oil Pollution Act, which required oil companies to create "detailed
containment and cleanup plan[s]" should a spill occur.' Similarly,
the 1974 Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA") was enacted, in part,
to ensure that industrial activities did not contaminate drinking
water. And most recently, the public reacted angrily toward the
Mineral Management Service ("MMS") for shoddy inspections,
poor recordkeeping, and lax enforcement of environmental laws in
the wake of the April 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster.
By contrast, the public has broadly embraced a new form of
natural gas extraction, although skepticism of the technology recently
has increased. High volume "slickwater" horizontal hydraulic
fracturing ("hydrofracking" or "fracking") is an innovative process
of extracting natural gas from subsurface shale formations that has
expanded rapidly nationwide. As of 2011 it occurred in 34 states,
and 90 percent of the nation's roughly 450,000 operating gas wells
rely on fracking - slickwater or otherwise - for gas extraction.' As
See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REv. 683, 713-14 (1999).
2 EPA, Oil Pollution Act Overview, EMVERGENCY MANAGEENT, http:Awww.epa.
gov emergencies/content/lawsregs/opaover.htm (last updated Jan. 28, 2011).
EPA, Safe Water DrinkingAct (SDWA), WATER, http:/ /water.epa.gov /laxwsregs!
rulesregs/sdwa/index.cfm (last updated Mar. 6, 2012).
4 Editorial, Gulf Pays Price for Laxity at Minerals Oversight Agency, USA
TODAY (May 24, 2010), http:xx/www.usatoday com/news/opinion/editorials
/2010-05-25-editorial25 ST N.htm.
Tom Zeller, E.PRA. to Study Chemicals Used to Tap Natural Gas, N.Y.
TuEs (Sept.
10, 2010), http:/xxwww.nytimes.com/2010/09/10/business!
energyenvironment/0hydraulic.htmnl. This number includes both slickwater hydiraulic fracturing and traditional fracturing of vertical wxells. Id.
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the industry moves into areas unaccustomed to drilling pads, the
process is literally transforming the American landscape.0
Pennsylvania is a case in point. The state sits atop the
sprawling Marcellus shale formation, and has seen a massive
increase in hydrofracking since 2008 (see Figure 1, infra). The
state is "the Saudi Arabia of natural gas" for its potential to meet
the nation's gas demand for decades.' The Pennsylvania Department
of Environmental Protection ("DEP") granted only four drilling
permits in 2005, but that number soared to more than 3,000 by the
end of 2010.9 Gas companies have already leased one-quarter of the
state's entire landmass - or seven million acres -for fracking, and
there will be an estimated 60,000 new wells in Pennsylvania by the
year 2030.10
Unlike conventional gas extraction, hydrofracking involves
injecting highly-pressurized chemicals mixed with millions of
gallons of water and sand underground."
Since fracking for natural gas began in earnest in the early
2000s, there haxve been more than one thousand allegations of ground
and surface water contamination.12 Despite such reports, public calls
for greater regulatory oversight, particularly at the federal level,
have not materialized. fThis is despite growing public skepticism
6Elizabeth

McGowan, Fracking'sEnvironmental Footprint to Transform Pennsylvania Landscape, REUTERS, Apr. 25, 2011, available at http:x/x/www.reuters.
comarticle/2011/04/25/ idUS308837987220110425.
IPa. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Statewide DataDownloads by ReportingPeriod,OIL &
GAs RLPORTING WEBSITE (Mar. 8, 2012, 10:21 p.m.), https:/.xwww.paoilandgasreporting.state.pa.us/publicreports/Modules/DataExports/DataExports.aspx.

IMcGowan, supra note 6.
0Id.
101d.
" Ian Urbina, Chemicals Were Injected into Wells, Report Says, N.Y. TNEs (Apr.
17, 2011), http://xwww.nytimes.com/2011/ 04/17/science/earth/17gas.htnl.
12Abraham Lustgarten, Buried Secrets: Is NaturalGas DrillingEndangeringU.S.
Water Supplies?, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 13, 2008), http://xwww.propublica.org/article/
buried-secrets-is-natural-gas-drilling-endangering-us-water-supplies- 1113 [hereinafter Lustgarten Buried Secrets].
Several rural counties and states continue to support fracking and oppose federal regulation of the practice under the Safe Drinking Xater Act. See infa notes
126-136.
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over fracking's impacts on public health and the environment.14
Indeed, while one-time toxic disasters like Love Canal and the
Exxon-Valdez oil spill incited national outrage and demands for a
strong federal response,'" Congress exempted hydrofracking from
the Safe Drinking Water Act in 2005.
This note looks at why fracking has proliferated so rapidly
despite a combination of scarce - if growing - scientific data on
its environnental impacts and numerous reports - confirmed or not
- of contamination. The analysis in this note is conducted through
a behavioral law and economics lens, and the note posits that
landowners continue to lease their land for drilling because of three
factors: (1) they do not perceive long-term risks (an informational
asymmetry); (2) they feel they have nothing to gain, but something to
lose, by not leasing (a power asymmetry that reflects a landowners'
prisoner's dilemma); and (3) an evolving regulatory environment
that leaves few places off-limits to fracking.
In the case of asymmetrical information, this note finds two
mutually reinforcing dynamics. First, the disparity in information
on the part of landowners vis- -vis an industry lessee is more
consequential in the absence of a strong regulatory regime. For
example, a landowner's ignorance that fracking on his land could
contaminate his well water would be less significant if compliance
with federal laws forbade fracking beneath aquifers. Second,
industry resistance to independent, peer-reviewed scientific studies
of the health and environmental impacts of fracking contributes to a
state of"infornation confusion." Under these conditions, guaranteed
upfront financial gains prevail over unknown risks. Moreover, the
absence of widely disseminated and credible information on the
consequences of fracking may also delay - if not altogether forestall
- public demands for the very regulatory oversight that could
compensate for asymmetrical information.
14AbrahamLustgaten, Fracking Cracks the Public Consciousness in 2011, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 29, 20111), http://xwww.propublica.org/article/fracking-cracks-thepublic consciousness-in-201II/single.
, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was enacted shortly after the Exxon Valdez spill
off the coast of Alaska in 1989. Similarly, CERCLA, enacted in 1980, was seen
largely as a response to the toxic hazardous wxaste discovery in Love Canal, Newx
York. See Kuran & Sunstein, s upranote 1.
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Even where landowners might embrace the precautionary
principle in the context of poor information and weak oversight,
they are at a significant power disadvantage. This is due, in part,
to evolving jurisprudence over common law nuisance and trespass
claims involving mineral estates that favor lessees over landowners.
It is also the result of economic realities caused by hydrofracking,
wxhich can bring big profits to some landowners, but tougher
economic conditions for others (see Part I.A.iv, infra).
Part I of this paper discusses the technical aspects of
hydrofracking. Part II analyzes informational asymmetries between
landowners and industry, and how that might simultaneously
encourage landowners to lease and discourage calls for stronger
regulations. Part III examines power asymmetries between
landowners and industry in light of lax regulatory oversight,
particularly in rural agricultural communities hard hit by the
economic recession. This section considers economic and legal
forces that encourage landowners to lease.

I. THE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING PROCESS
Slickwater hydrofracking had its inception inthe Barnett shale
formation in Texas in the early 2000s, expanding northward through
sparsely populated areas of Colorado and Wyoming. 6In the last few
years it has expanded eastward to the densely populated states sitting
atop the Marcellus shale formation, namely Pennsylvania, New
York, Ohio, and West Virginia." Fracking proponents highlight the
United States' abundant domestic reserves of shale gas - enough to
supply the nation for 110 years according to the Energy Information
Administration ("EIA"), 8 natural gas's relative cleanliness when
6R.R. Comm'n of Tex., Water Use in the Barnett Shale, BARNETT SHALE, http:/
www.rrc.state.tx.us/barnettshale/ waterusebarnettshale.php (last updated Jan. 24,
2011).
-LAMarcellus Shale -Appalachian Basin Natural Gas Play, GEOLOGY.COM, http:/
geology.com/articles/marcellus shale.shtml (last visited June 1, 2011).
'U.S. Energy Info. Admin., How Ahich Shale Gas Does the UnitedStates Have?,
FAQ, http:/205.254.135.7/tools/faqs! faq.cfm?id=58&t= 8 (last updated Jan. 30,
2012).
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burned, and economic benefits to landowners and communities.' 9
A Pennsylvania State University study found that hydrofracking
could generate $13.5 billion in economic output and 175,000 jobs
in 2020.20

Modern hydrofracking involves drilling into shale formations
that are 5,000 to 8,000 feet underground to release trapped natural
gas.2 1 The largest formation inthe United States is the Marcellus
Shale. Close behind is the Barnett shale formation inNorthern Texas,
with others scattered throughout Colorado, Wyoming, California,
Arkansas, North Dakota, and dozens of other states. It has been long
known that these formations contain rich pockets of natural gas. But
it was only in 2003 that Halliburton perfected the fracking technique
and combined it with horizontal directional drilling, thereby making
it economically viable.
The modern process involves a substantial commitment of
natural resources: each "frack job" demands three to nine million
gallons of water, and one well can be "fracked" multiple times. An
April 2011 congressional study found that between 2005 and 2009,
fourteen oil and gas companies used more than 2,500 hydrofracking
products containing 750 chemicals and other components. The
19Poll Finds NY Residents Divided on Hydraulic Fracturing ofNatural Gas Wells,
ASSOCIATED PREss, May 18, 2011, available at http://xwww.dailyjournal.net/viewst
ory/94de80ea7143440783c0f05519ac5ee6/NY--Hydraulic-Fracturing-Poll/.
20 TIMOTHY CONSIDINE, ROBERT WATSON, ET AL., AN EMERGING GIANT: PROSPECTS
AND EcoNomic IMPACTS OF DEVELOPING THE MARCELLUS SHALE NATURAL GAs PLAY
(2009), available at http://allegheny conference.org/PDFs/PELMisc PSUStudyMarcellusShale072409.pdf.
21PA. DEPT OF ENVTL. PROT., MARCELLUS SHALE FACT SHEET 1 (2011), available
at
http://".."www.elibrary.dep.state.pa.us/dsweb/Get/Document-85899/0100-FSDEP4217.pdf. The depth of the shale varies depending on location. This data is
based on the depth of the Marcellus shale formation, which is by far the largest
in the nation.

Hydraulic Fracturing 101, HYiDRALlIC FRACTURING: A LOOK BACK,
http:xx/w ww.halliburton.com/public/projects/pubsdata/Hy draulicFracturing/fracturing_101.html (last visited May 15, 2012).
23 MINORITY STAFF OF U.S. H. ENERGY & COMMERCE COMMa., 112TH CONG., CHEICALS USED IN HYiDRALlIC FRACTURING 1 (Apr. 2011), available at http://democrats.
energy commerce.house.govsites/default/ files/documents/Hydraulico20Fracturing% 20Report% 204. 18.11 .pdf.
22 Halliburton,

226 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19

companies used 780 million gallons of fracking products, not
including water, which serves as the solvent.24 Water accounts for up
to ninety-nine percent of the fracturing fluid. That water is mixed
with sand and a chemical cocktail called "fracking fluid" that is
injected into a manmade borehole under extremely high pressure to
induce fractures in the shale, thereby releasing natural gas.26
Estimates vary as to the proportion of fracking fluid that
remains underground. About three-quarters of the fluid might stay
below the surface, at least in the Marcellus shale formation. 'The
rest of the fluid returns to the surface under the pressure of released
methane (the main component of natural gas). This "produced water"
contains methane, fracking fluid chemicals, high concentrations of
total dissolved solids ("TDS"), and radioactive materials, including,
in some cases, radium and uranium."
State regulations for managing produced water vary
dramatically, from requiring containment in steel drums until it
can be shipped to a wastewater treatment plant, to land disposal."
Regardless of the regulatory environment, better infrastructure is
needed to support burgeoning volumes of wastewater. Treatment
plants in Pennsylvania, for example, are overwhelmed by produced
water shipments. Even after processing, the resulting water solution
can contain high concentrations of TDS.30
Accidents also happen. Produced water can leak from
fracking pipes and into the water table due to faulty cement casings:
24

1d.

Mark Jaffe, Drillers Claim "Trade Secrets" When They Don'tReveal Chemicals
in FrackingFluid, DENVER PosT (Dec. 4, 2011), http:/xxwww.denverpost.com/business/ci 19461782? source rss.
26
MichaelA. Valenza, Digest o Selected Articles, 39 REAL EST. L.J. 225 (2010).
27 Abraham Lustgarten, In New Gas Wells, More Drilling Chemicals Remain Underground, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 27 2009), http:// xxwww.propublica.org/ article/newgas-wells-leave-more-chemicals-in-ground-hydraulic-fracturing.
28
1 an Urbina, Regulation Lax as Gas Wells'Tainted Water Hits Rivers, N.Y.TIMEs
(Feb.26, 2011), HTTP:.!WWW.NYTIMES.COM /2011/02/27/us/27GAs.HTML [hereinafter
Urbina, Regulation Lax].
29 See Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in FracturedAppalachia, 21
VILL. EvTL. L.J. 229 (2010).
*Urbina, RegulationLax, supra note 28.
2
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it can spill from pipes above ground: or it can seep into the ground
from containment ponds. In June 2010, a well blow-out in central
Pennsylvania resulted in a surface spill of fracking fluid wastewater 41
More dramatically, a well operated by Chesapeake Energy Corp.
blew out in northeastern Pennsylvania in April 2011, spewing
thousands of gallons of water and chemicals into a stream and
forcing an evacuation of local residents. 32 The situation is becoming
acute in some areas of Pennsylvania, particularly around Pittsburgh,
wx
here fracking development is intense. The Monongahela River
now carries such high concentrations of TDS that steel companies
find the water unfit even for industrial use.
Many, if not most, natural gas wells are drilled on private
land or public lands leased by town boards. By 2012 the nation
could be drilling 32,000 new wells a year.3 That said, there is
currently a temporary ban on drilling in the sensitive Delaware
River Watershed by the interstate agency with jurisdiction over the
area: the Delaware River Basin Commission ("DRBC"). The Basin
includes the Catskills, which supplies unfiltered drinking water to
more than fifteen million people, including Philadelphia and New
York City.
A. The Current Regulatory Environment
Information and power asymmetries between landowners
and gas companies are more consequential in the absence of strong
mitigating regulations. This section gives a brief overview of the
current regulatory regime governing the process.
'See Ben Casselman, Pennsylvania Gas-Well Blowout Forces Evacuation, WALL
ST. J. (April 20, 2011), http:./online.wsj.com/article/SB100 01424052748704570
704576275353686652670.htnl; Valenza, supra note 26.
32 Casselman, supra note 31.
1 Don Hopey, State Wants To Tighten Controls On Waste Water From Gas
Wells, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Apr. 8, 2010), http://xwww.post-gazette.com/
pg/10098/1048747454. stm#ixzzl87RFJbe3.
34 See Valenza, supranote 26.
3 Eliza Griswold, The Fracturing of Pennsylvania, N.Y. TNEs (Nov. 17, 2011),
w x .nytimes.com/2011
;
11/20/magfazine/fracking-amwAelltowVnship.html?
pagevwanted= all.
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Environmental regulations ensure that the public and the
environient are not subject to "unreasonable" harm, usually
resulting from industrial activities. Ideally, regulations compensate
for asymmetries between individuals and industry in two ways.
First, those vested with the power to regulate private entities
have expertise in those activities, and so are in the best position
to manage, mitigate, and minimize environmental externalities.
Second, if properly enforced, regulations ensure that even by his own
ignorance, a private landowner cannot unwittingly do environmental
damage beyond the limits imposed by regulation.
In the case of fracking, the federal government has little
statutory authority to oversee the industry. The Energy Policy Act
of 2005 exempted fracking from the SDWA, which requires the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to regulate "underground
injections" of materials that may endanger drinking water sources.
In 1997, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the EPA
should consider hydraulic fracturing to be a regulated underground
injection under the SDWA.3 In response, Congress inserted a
provision in the Energy Policy Act expressly exempting fracking
from the definition of "underground injection." 8 Thus, the SDWA
does not apply to fracking, and the EPA has no oversight authority. 39
Because gas companies conducting fracking operations do
not require a federal SDWA permit, they need not comply with the
U.S.C. § 300h (b)(1) (2010) (stating that 4[r]egulations under subsection (a)
for State underground injection programs shall contain minimum requirements
for effective programs to prevent underground injection which endangers drinking water sources").
Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. v. EPA, 118 F.2d 1467, 1471 (11th Cir. 1997)
(concluding that "hydraulic fracturing activities constitute 'underground injection' under Part C of the SDWA").
42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1) ("The term 'underground injection' excludes ... the
underground injection of fluids or propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production
642

activities.").

SDWA does apply, however, where fracking fluid contains diesel fuel. The
EPA has recently expressed an interest in regulating fracking operations using diesel fuel under the SDWA. Kate Winston, Industry Sues After EPA Quietly Requires
Permits fur Diesel Fracking, INSIDTIE EPA (Oct. 22, 2010), https://environmentalnewxsstand.com/Inside-EPA/Inside-EPA- 10/22/2010 /menu-id-298.htm1.
39The
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National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") on private lands. 0
That law requires an environmental impact assessment - either
an environmental assessment ('EA") or a much more thorough
environmental impact statement ("EIS") - for major federal actions
significantly impacting the environment, which include permitting. 1
Activities that have a significant environmental impact on
federal lands traditionally satisfy the requisite nexus to compel a
NEPA review, even if a separate federal permit is not required.4 But
Congress amended NEPA in 2005 with Section 390 of the Energy
Policy Act, which exempts most oil and gas production from NEPA.
Fracking's NEPA exemption means that gas production on
federal land or which have a federal nexus on private land - such as
those requiring permits under the Clean Water Act or Endangered
Species Act - escape public accountability mechanisms. For the
most part there is no trigger for public notice and comment, no
expert analysis of environmental impacts on a case-by-case basis,
and no consideration of alternatives.
Hydrofracking is also exempt from reporting requirements
of annual releases of toxic chemicals under the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-to-Know Act ("EPCRA"), from complying
with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") and
CERCLA, and from obtaining pollutant discharge permits under
the Clean Water Act ("CWA). 44 Those laws are important because
§ 4332. NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement ("EIS") for major federal actions that significantly affect
the quality of the human environment. Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 418 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2005).
41 "[I]f a federal permit is a prerequisite for a project with adverse impact on the
environment, issuance of that permit does constitute major federal action and the
federal agency involved must conduct an [Environmental Assessment] and possibly an [Environmental Impact Statement] before granting it. Ramsey v. Kantor,
96 F.3d 434, 444 (9th Cir. 1996).
42
See 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
43Id § 15942.
44
See Wiseman, supra note 29, at 243-44. Under another provision of the Energy Policy Act, Congress exempted fracking activities on the surface - including
pollutant discharges and sediment runoff at construction sites -from the Clean
Water Act. See N.Y Dep't of Enytl. Conservation, Effect ofFederalSaife Drinking
40 42 U.S.C.
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they decrease the risk that a collection of private landowners could,
through their individual actions, cause broad hanns to human health
and the environment.
State regulations are also inadequate. Most states - with
the exception of New York4 5 - waited until fracking was already
entrenched before updating their oil and gas statutes.4 6 In her
article analyzing the dramatic differences in state regulations,
Hannah Wiseman discusses the inadequacy of state oversight and
enforcement mechanisms.4 Substantial disparities in state regulatory
environments reflect a lack of agreement on minimum baseline
protections for protecting public health and the environment. For
example, a ProPublicastudy found that while forty-four percent of
states with fracking bar waste pits from intersecting with the water
table, fifty-six percent allow it.48 Moreover, only thirty-seven percent
of states require waste pits to be away from rivers and streams,
wxhile sixty-three percent do not.49 And while eight-five percent of
states with shale gas require the reporting of toxic fluid spills, fifteen
percent have no reporting requirements at all. 0
There are also deep divisions among states over whether
federal oversight is required. While two states - New Jersey and
Pennsylvania - have proposed resolutions calling for the repeal of
the SDWA exemption, at least seven state legislatures have urged
Congress to keep the EPA from regulating fracking.5
Water Act, Clean Water Act, and Emergency Planningand Community Right-toKnow Act, OIL & GAS - MARCELLUS SHALE, http://xwww.dec.ny.govienergy/46445.
html (last visited May 15, 2012).
45 The

New York Department of Environmental Conservation ("DEC") has
held off approving drilling permits until it finalizes regulations, expected out
in 2012. Mireya Navarro, N.Y Assembly Approves Fracking Moratoriun, N.Y.
TIMts GREEN BLOG (Nov. 30, 2010, 12:25 p.m.), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com
/2010/11/30/n-y-assembly-approves-fracking-moratorium/.
46
See generally Wiseman, supranote 29.
4
7See id.; See also, Abraham Lustgarten, Chart: Where States Fall on Oil and Gas
Regulation, PROPUBLICA (July 8, 2009), http://xxxwww.propublica.org/ article/chartnatural-gas-well-state-regulations-708.
49

Id.

*Id.
*Wyoming (2009 WY S.J.R. 5 (NS) (West)), Alaska (2009 AK S.JR. 14 (NS)
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A lack of credible, independent and peer-reviewed data
on fracking's impacts adds difficulty to achieving a cohesive and
adequate regulatory environment. The only federal study onfracking's
environmental impacts is a 2004 EPA analysis, the credibility
of which has been undermined by claims that it was politically
motivated and scientifically unsound. First, the report was narrow
in its scope, focusing only on the impacts of underground injection
of fracking fluids on underground water quality in coal-bed methane
formations. It did not look at impacts on shale formations. Second,
it did not consider environmental impacts related to non-injection
fracking activities, such as the "surface discharge of fracturing
and production fluids, poorly sealed or poorly installed production
wells, and improperly abandoned wells." It has been criticized as
being analytically deficient for its lack of adherence to scientific
methodology.5 Weston Wilson, an EPA whistleblower who exposed
deficiencies in the report, noted that "five of the seven members of
[the EPA study] panel appear to have conflicts-of-interest and may
benefit from EPA's decision not to conduct further investigation or
impose regulatory conditions." 5 The EPA is currently conducting a
(West)), North Dakota (2009 ND S.C.R. 4020 (NS) (West)), Utah (2009 UT S.J.R.
17 (NS) (West)), Alabama (2009 AL H.J.R. 254 (NS) (West)), Oklahoma (2009
OK H.C.R. 1012 (NS) (West)), Louisiana (2009 LA H.C.R. 38 (NS) (West)), Mississippi (2009 MS S.C.R. 636 (NS) (West)).
52 See, e.g., Abraham Lustgarten & Sabrina Shankman, Congress Tells EPA to
Study Hydraulic Fracturing,PROPUBLICA (Nov. 10, 2009), http://xwww.propublica.
org/article/congress-tells-epa-to-study-hy draulic-fracturing-hinchey-1110.
See Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturingin
Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FoRDHAMN ENVTL. L. RE.m 115, 195 (2009) [hereinafter Wiseman, Untested Waters] (citing
EPA, EvALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROLND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RLSERVOIRS, 6-1, 6-2 (June 2004)
available at http://xwww.epa.gov/OGWDW/uic/pdfs/cbmstudyattach uic ch04
hyd frac fluids.pdf).
54 See id. at 170-73. The EPA study was not scientifically rigorous in that it did
not "conduct scientific analysis of toxicological data or toxicity pathways in
human[s]." Id. at 171.
See Letter from Weston Wilson, EPA Employee, to Wayne Allard, Ben Nighthorse Campbell and Diana DeG ette (Oct. 8, 2004) at 5, iadablea http:// la
imes.image2.trb.com/ lanewxs/media/acrobat/200410/14647025.pdf.
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more comprehensive study due out by the end of 2012.16
Preliminary findings by the EPA support anecdotal accounts
of water contamination following hydraulic fracturing operations. In
December 2011, the EPA released a tentative finding from a threeyear study of alleged water contamination in Pavillion, Wyoming.,
Residents complained that after Enacana began fracking operations
in 2004. their water began smelling and tasting different. The
EPAs two deep-water monitoring wells of the aquifer indicated
the presence of synthetic chemicals, such as glycols and alcohols
consistent with gas production and fracking fluids.59 Other toxic
petroleum hydrocarbons and chemical compounds also were found
in private and public drinking water wells. 0 Encana strongly disputes
the findings, and the EPA noted that, unlike fracking operations in
other parts of the country, fracking in Pavillion occurs directly in the
water table and much closer to the surface.61
A peer-reviewed study by Duke University scientists
in May 2011 made similar findings.> The paper was narrower
in scope than the ongoing EPA study, analyzing only whether
hydraulic fracturing contributes to groundwater contamination in
northeastern Pennsylvania and New York.6 3 The study found that
methane concentrations were on average seventeen times higher
Abrahm Lustgarten, As EPA Broadens Study of Fracking, Industry Ire Boils,
(April 7, 2010), http://xwww.newwest.net/topic/article/ as epa broadens studyof fracking industiy ire boils/C35/L35.
5 Press Release, EPA, EPA Releases Draft Findings of Pavillion, Wyoming
Ground Water Investigation for Public Comment and Independent Scientific Review (Dec. 8, 2011), available at http://yosemite.epa.goviopa acmpress.nsf/0/
EF35BD26A80D6CE3852579600065C94E.
Kirk Johnson, EPA. Links Tainted Water in Woming to HydraulicFracturing
for NaturalGas, N.Y. TMEus (Dec. 8,2011), http://"."www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/
us/epa-say s-hydraulic-fracturing-likely-marred-wy oming-water.html.
9
5 See Press Release, EPA, supra note 57.
56

NEwWEST

6 Id
62 See ROBERT B. JACKSON ET AL., RESEARCH AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND SHALE-GAs EXTRACTION (May 2009), available at http://

www.nicholas.duke.edu/cgc/Hydraulic

Id. at 4.
6Id

FracturingWhitepaper2011.pdf.
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in drinking water wells near active drilling areas.64 That level is
considered hazardous by the U.S. Department of the Interior.65 The
study also found elevated levels of butane, propane, and ethane in
drilling areas.66 The authors concluded that much more research is
needed into the potential health impacts of methane contamination.
They also recommended that more should be done to collect data on
groundwater quality before drilling operations commence. 7
A lax regulatory environment based on inadequate information leaves landowners in the untenable position of determining
whether fracking leases are worth the unknown health and
environnental costs. The next section analyzes the impacts of
informational and power asymmetries on individual landowner
decisions to lease their land for drilling.

II. ASYMMETRIC

INFORMATION

&

RATIONAL CHOICE

THEORY

A. Choosing Short-Term Gains Over Unknown Long-Term
Costs
Rational choice theory suggests that two factors influence a
landowner's decision whether to lease for drilling. First, assuming
that a healthful environment is a commonly held value, then
widespread environmental impacts are tempered by each individual's
self-interest to avert negative environmental externalities. 6 8 For
example, if farmer A's decision to lease might contaminate farmer
B's well water, which will dirty farmer A's well too, he rationally
would not run the risk of endangering his own health.
But the theory also suggests that actors who engage in
environmentally risky - but not easily detectable - activities will
64d.
6 Id.at 2.
66Id

at 5.
e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future ofBehavioral Economic Analysis ofLaw, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1766 (1998) ("Conventional law and economics assumes that people exhibit rational choice: that people are self-interested
utility maximizers w%1ith
stable preferences and the capacity to optimally accumulate and assess information.").
67Icd

61See,
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expend resources concealing and contesting those harms rather
than affirmnatively gathering and providing information that could
raise awareness about potential negative externalities resulting
from their operations.69 It is not a novel argument that independent
and peer-reviewed scientific information is needed to inform all
levels of decision-making - from the individual landowner to the
federal government." Without public information on the latent risks
of industrial activities, easily perceptible financial gains make a
potentially harmful practice seem like an unqualified win-win." So
what does farmer A do if he does not know the environmental risks
of drilling?
In the case of hydraulic fracturing, most of the activity takes
place thousands of feet below the surface - invisible to landowners
who lack the expensive equipment to monitor what happens below
ground. Landowners are at an informational disadvantage vis-a-vis
industry experts to determine whether a highly technical operation
involving the injection of hundreds of diluted chemicals into the
ground poses an environmental or health hazard. Gas companies
know the technical details of fracking, including the depth of the
shale formation and its proximity to the water table, whether there
are any fault lines in the vicinity that could increase the risk ofxwater
contamination, the current quality of the landowner's water, and
what chemicals they inject underground. Landowners, by and large,
are not privy to this information.
Without countervailing information, a rational landowner
may be more inclined to "take the money and run," especially if he
does not perceive potentially serious long-term consequences. Dish
and Argyle, Texas, illustrate the effect of asymmetrical information.
The two towns are located outside of Fort Worth, atop the Barnett
shale formation. The region was the first to experience the fracking
boom near populated areas in the first half of the decade - before
anecdotal evidence suggested that the procedure was not entirely
E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of EnvironmentalLaw to
ProduceNeeded Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DLKE L.J. 1619,
1622, 1631-32 (2004).
7Id. at 1622, 1624.
1
I d at 1622.
69Wendy
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benign. 2 From 2003 to 2008, the number of wells drilled in Texas
nearly doubled to more than 16,000.7 Not knowing the risks,
residents of the small town of Dish leased their land to five gas
companies for drilling. 4 Soon after, residents began complaining
about the noise and fumes coming from the eleven natural gas
compression stations near the town's southern border." Because
neither the EPA 6 nor the Texas Commission on Environmental
Quality ("TCEQ") had studied or monitored the air emissions from
the fracking compressors, residents had little reason not to accept
industry assurances that the noise and emissions were "normal," let
alone safe./
As reports of health problems - including headaches,
dizziness, blackouts, and muscle contractions - increased, the town
commissioned its own environmental assessment at a cost of fifteen
percent of its annual budget./" The air study showed high levels of
carcinogens and neurotoxins, including the highly carcinogenic
72

John Burnett, Health Issues Follow Natural Gas Drilling In Texas, NAIoNAL

R-ArIo (Nov. 3, 2009), available at http://,"www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.phpstoryld 120043996.
Buried Secrets: Gas Drilling's Environmental Impact: Texas, PROPUBLICA,
http://projects.propublica.org/gas-drilling-regulatory-staffing/states/TX (last visited May 15, 2012).
74
See Burnett, supranote 72.
, Id.
6Lowell Brown & Britney Tabor, Parents Voice Health Concerns: Gas drilling Near Argyle Schools Making Kids Ill, Residents Tell Board, DENTON
RLCORD-CHRONICLE (Oct. 25, 2010) http://cleanwaternotdirty drilling.org /dimock-pa/101-parents-voice-health-concerns-gas-drilling-near-argyle-schoolsmaking-kids-ill-residents-tell-board.
7See
Burnett, supranote 72.
7
1Id. These are common symptoms reported by people living near hydrofracking operations. Residents in Pennsylvania, for example, also complained of
burning eyes, sore throats, and other symptoms. See, e.g., Marianne Lavelle, -4
Dream Dashedby the Rush on Gas, NAIoNAL GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 17, 2010), http://
new s.nationalgeographic .com/news/2010/10/101022 -energy-marcellus-shalegas-environment/ (a homemaker from Wise County, Texas described "weeks of
nosebleeds, rashes, welts, stuttering and shaking by her 8-year-old daughter, her
rancher husband and herself, which she linked to airborne chemicals from the
twenty-one wxells around their rural property."').
PUBLIC
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compound benzene.79 By the time residents became aware of the
threat, much of the town's land was already leased. As Dish's mayor
put it, "Ifyou don't learn from what has happened here, by the time
the odor gets bad enough for you not to want it there, by the time
the noise gets loud enough that it's disturbing you, it's already too

late." 80
Years later, and presumably knowledgeable that nearby
towns, like Dish, were ground zero for fracking, the Argyle school
district signed a gas drilling lease on 110 acres of district-owned
property." Argyle is located just nine miles from Dish. The decision
seemed manifestly rational. In less than two years, the district
received more than $680,000 in revenue from the leases, which
allowed it to balance its budget. 82Today, however, students complain
of the same symptoms that residents suffer from in Dish: dizziness,
nausea, nosebleeds, and chest pains. A TCEQ air quality study is
pending, but a January 2010 analysis of Barnett Shale drilling sites
found elevated levels of benzene.8 4
Following the pattern, two years later in Fall 2010 another
school board, this one in South Fayette, Pennsylvania, signed a
207-acre gas lease.5 Apparently unaware of the possible long-term
impacts to public health experienced in other areas, the school
board quickly signed the lease with little public discussion and with
only five of the nine board members present.8 6 While they did little
research into the health and environmental costs of gas drilling, they
did know that they would immediately receive $414,000 in acreage
fees. 8 That would cover the school's required contributions to the

" See Burnett, supranote 72.
80Id
1
See
82

1d

Brown & Tabor, supra note 76.

"Id.
Id

84

, Andrea Iglar, Residents Criticize South Fayette Xchool Boardfor Allowing Gas
Drilling, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 28, 2010), http://xwww.post-gazette.
compg/10301/1098576-57.stm#ixzzl8IOdBWp8.
886tId4

Id
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Public School Employees' Retirement System." After receiving
heavy criticism from residents who voiced health and environmental
concerns, the board president stated that he would vote against the
lease if he could do so again: "Ihave much more information today
than I had then," he said."
Perhaps the best-known example of a community embracing
gas drilling without knowing the risks is Dimock, Pennsylvania. 0
Cabot Oil &Gas purchased land leases at the start ofthe Pennsylvania
fracking boom in 2008, and allegedly told residents that "the
drilling would have no impact whatsoever on [residents'] land." 91
Within a month, residents' water had turned brown and Cabot was
fined $360,000 by the PA DEP for water contamination." Cabot
continues to claim the contamination was naturally occurring, but on
December 15, 2010 - after two years of legal wrangling - it agreed
to pay $4.1 million to provide the nineteen Dimock households
with potable water. Each household will receive at least $50,000,
which may not satisfy the permanent damage to land values and
future, unanticipated costs associated with water contamination.94
"Our land is worthless," said one landowner. "Who is going to buy
this house?"' As part of the settlement, Cabot will be permitted to
continue drilling in Dimock.9
The experiences of Dish, Argyle, and Dimock are not
isolated." Yet the meteoric rise in gas drilling continues 98 in the
context of persistent perceptions that up front financial gains are

8

Id.
Id.

June 21, 2010,
available at http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features! 2010/06/fracking-inpennsylvania-201006.
90 Christopher Bateman, A Colossal Fracking Adess, VANITY FAIR,

91Id.

92Id
93Jon Hurdle,

CabotTo Pay$4.1 M illionInPenn. Gas Contamination,REUTERS, Dec.
15, 2010, available at http://xwww.reuters.com/article/idUSN1518374720101216.
94Id
95See Bateman, supranote 90.
96See Hurdle, supra note 93.
97See Lustarten,supra note 12.
98Id.
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worth prospective and hypothetical costs. The next section looks
at why such perceptions continue despite more than one thousand
reported incidents of contamination, and how these perceptions
have stunted calls for regulatory reform that could help protect
landowners.
B. Informational Parity is Critical to Passage of Sensible
Regulations that Protect Landowners and Communities
Informational parity is important not only to help individual
landowners make informed decisions, but to incite public calls for
regulatory reform that can mitigate the effects of asymmetrical
information. In the absence ofcredible information, the most powerful
information is that which speaks the loudest. 99 As one behavioral
theory posits, information is the key to informed policymaking: the
public will demand or not demand regulations of private industry
based on the (1) perceived frequency of an environmental hazard
and (2) that hazard's salience. 100 A perception that an environmental
hazard rarely happens and poses little threat when it does minimizes
broad-based calls for increased regulation.101 A perception that
an environnental hazard is serious and could happen elsewhere,
however, can increase public pressure for strong regulatory action. 0
In the case of hydrofracking, even as awareness of fracking
increases, public perceptions of its hazardous nature remain mixed,

and calls for broad regulatory reform remain muted. Iwo factors
could explain this: (1) the lack of credible independent, peerreviewed scientific studies of fracking's environnental and public
health impacts (see Part II, supra), and (2) an effective public
relations campaign by industry as well as regulators that frames the
process as a safe means of creating jobs, fostering economic growth
in regions hard-hit by the recession, and achieving energy security
that fracking is a clear win-win-win.

9
0

I
See id at 740-41.

orId
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Cass Sunstein, et al., discuss Congress' passage of CERCLA
to show how increased information can shape public perceptions
and galvanize calls for stronger regulations. CERCLA was enacted
largely in response to national media attention focused on Love
Canal, in New York, a highly contaminated hazardous waste site
that seented to typify a serious national problem. 0In response to
the "saturation" of stories covering the single event, nearly eighty
percent of Americans supported quick federal action to identify and
remediate hazardous waste sites. 10 4
By contrast, reports of health issues and environmental
impacts from Dimock, Dish, Argyle, and elsewhere were not widely
broadcast. That could help explain why, despite harmful effects
experienced in these areas, the school board of South Fayette,
Pennsylvania embraced fracking as a relatively low-risk, highbenefit enterprise, just to question the decision later.'10 It was only
in 2011 - three years after fracking came to Pennsvlvania - that the
New York Times ran a series analyzing environnental and health
impacts of fracking, particularly with regard to more urbanized
communities in Pennsylvania. 0 ' Analysts attribute at least some of
the newfound fears of fracking in Fort Worth and Dallas to increased
media attention on Pennsylvania, illustrating the correlation between
critical media coverage and citizen actiism 07
This failure to perceive a danger could be understandable
if the few incidents detailed above were discrete outliers - even in
spite of the "Love Canal effect," where a single event is projected
nationally.'0 But there are at least one thousand cases of water
contamination documented by several courts and state and local
governments.' 09 State records in Colorado alone show 1,500
3
1 See

Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 1.

1'4Id. at 740.
0'Another explanation is that the Dimock, Argyle, and Dish situations were still
too new and the causes of the health problems relatively unknown compared to
the Love Canal and Cheshire incidents.
106 See Urbina, Regulations Lax, supra note 28.
17Kate Galbraith, Resistance to Gas DrillingRises on Unlikely Soil, N.Y. TInMEs,
April 24, 2011, at A23A.
8
10
ee Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 740-41.
9
"Lustgarten,
Buried Secrets, supra note 12.
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fracking-related chemical spills, at least 300 ofwhich had measurable
impacts on water supplies.1 a What is missing is critical information
such as disclosure and broad reporting of the toxic chemicals used
in fracking fluid - that could either validate or debunk the industry's
claim that fracking is safe. 1 Also missing is a comprehensive and
credible independent study of the process's environmental and
health impacts.
The power that information has on public perceptions helps
to explain the industry's unqualified insistence that fracking is
environmentally safe, economically beneficial, and a viable means
of achieving energy independence.'" It also helps to explain why
thousands of landowners have willingly leased their mineral rights,
and why natural gas promotion is a largely bipartisan venture."3
Residents who own their mineral rights can get rich literally overnight
while - the argument goes - contributing to energy independence. 1 14
Indeed, President Obama has espoused the conventional wisdom of
natural gas's smaller carbon footprint compared to oil - although it
is unclear if this holds true when applied to this new, unconventional
form of extraction." 5 In March 2011, Mr. Obama endorsed switching
110Abraham Lustgarten, Hydraulic Fracturing Controversy over Water Contamination Rages On, THE COLORADO INiDEPENiDENT (Jan. 14, 2009), http://colora-

doindependent.com/19410/hydraulic-fracturing-controversy -over-watercontamination-rages-on.
"nId.
" See supranotes 90-93.

See, e.g., Dave Michaels, Obama Endorses Pickens Planfor Natural Gas Vehicles, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Mar. 30, 2011), http:/.xwww.dallasnews.com/
business/energy/2011033 0-obama-endorses-pickens-plan-for-natural-gas-vehicles.ece. President Obama has promoted legislation worth $5 billion, known as
the NAT GAS Act. It would provide subsidies to commercial truckers to switch
from diesel to natural gas engines, and would expand a federal tax credit for owners of fueling stations that sell compressed and liquefied natural gas. Id.
114See, e.g., Ramit Plushnick-Masti & Michael Rubinkam, Gas Drilling'sPromise, Perils Rile Townsfolk, ASSOCIAFED PREss, Apr. 12, 2011, available at http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/apr/12/gas-drillings-promise-perils-riletownsfolk/?page all.
"1See Michaels, supranote 113.
113
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the nation's heavy-duty commercial fleet from diesel to natural
gas.116 The industry has also promoted a vote for natural gas as a
vote to switch away from coal and oil - a particularly salient point
in the wake of BP's Deepwater Horizon disaster and public concerns
over energy independence.
Consistent with rational choice theory, industry has opposed
any independent analyses of hydrofracking's environmental
impacts; contested most, if not all, claims of fracking-related
water contamination:'" and has resisted calls for disclosure of the
chemicals it uses in fracking fluid, arguing that the information is
proprietary.1 19 Indeed, in the spring of 2011, the EPA subpoenaed
Halliburton for failing to turn over the chemical composition of its
fracking fluid, and two gas companies have refused to comply with
Wyoming's new law requiring disclosure to state regulators.20 Yet
the companies continue to claim that the procedure is completely
safe, noting, for instance, that fracking fluid is 99.5% water and
sand"' and citing the 2004 EPA study finding no threat to water
6Id.

See, e.g., Natural Gas and the En ', NALTRALGAS.ORG, http:v/v/www.naturalgas.
org/environment/naturalgas.asp (last visited May 15, 2012).
11 Abraham Lustgarten, As EPA Broadens Study of Fracking,Industry Ire Boils,
NEw WEST DEVELOPMENT (Apr. 7, 2010), http://."www.newwest.net/topic/article.
asepa broadens study of frackingindustiy_ire boils/C35/L35/;
Lustgarten
Buried Secrets, supra note 12. "The industry insisted, as it has for years, that hydraulic fracturing itself had never contaminated a well, pointing to an anecdotal
survey done a decade ago by the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission, a
coalition of state regulatory bodies and, again, to the 2004 study by the EPA." Id.
"9Lustgarten Buried Secrets, supra note 12. Industry groups argue that releasing
specific details about the chemical composition of fracking fluid would frighten
and confuse the public, and hurt individual fracking fluid manufacturers' - like
Halliburton - competitive edge. Id. Halliburton has gone so far as to argue that
disclosure would be an unconstitutional taking of private property. Id.
120Marie C. Baca, Two Companies Seek Trade Secret Status for FrackingFluids
in Wyoming, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 2, 2010), http://x
www.propublica.org/ article,/twocompanies-seek-trade-secret-status-for-fracking-fluids-in-wy oming.
121 It is difficult to contest this without knowing how much that other 0.5% matters, and that requires knowing what that percent is. The only comprehensive, independent study of hydrofracking's environmental impacts to date, the N.Y. DEC
117
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sources from fracking.122
No doubt natural gas firms have a legitimate interest in
contesting claims of contamination, particularly if those claims are
based on questionable assertions of causation. But there also is a
strong public policy argument favoring more, rather than fewer,
analyses of fracking's environmental and health impacts. More
dispassionate studies could lend credibility to industry claims that
health and environmental threats are overblown. Due to the 2010
documentary Gasland and increased news coverage (see Figure
1), the public at large is becoming aware that hydrofracking is
occurring in more than thirty states, with plans to expand. Thus, if
fracking is responsible for one or two accidents somewhere, then the
same thing could happen anywhere, and calls for stronger regulation
would follow, much as occurred with the perceived national threat
following Love Canal. Passage of the FRAC Act,1 I"which would
repeal fracking's 2005 exemption from the SDWA could become
a national cause c616bre, just as the public demanded passage of
CERCLA after the Love Canal disaster.

report, suggests that even if the fracking fluid, or "produced water," that comes
back to the surface is highly diluted, it remains highly toxic to human health and
ecosystems. N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 5-99-5-113 (2009), available at ftp.dec.state.
ny.us/dmn/download/OGdSGEISFull.pdf.
122 See 42 U.S.C. §300h(d)(1) (2010); Lindsay Renick Mayer, Big Oil, Big Influence, NOW (Aug. 1,2008), http://xwww.pbs.org/nowshows/347/oil-politics.html;
Winston, supra note 39.
123See, e.g., Nicholas Kusnetz, Exxon Ad AMakes Gas Drilling Seem Simpler - and
Safer - Than it Really Is, PROPUBLICA (May 25, 2011), http://."www.propublica.org/
article/exxon-ad-makes-gas-drilling-seem-simpler-and-safer-than-it-really -is. Indeed, the gas industry has launched an aggressive ad campaign to dispel claims of
water contamination resulting from hydraulic fracturing. Id. The public relations
push comes soon after Pennsylvania's Department of Environmental Protection
issued its largest ever fine against Chesapeake Energy after casing failures allowed methane to contaminate the water supply for sixteen homes. Id.
24
1 FRAC Act, S. 1215, 1111th Cong. (2009), available at http:xx/www.govtrack.us!
congress/billtextxpd?bill sl 11-1215.
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But that is not what is happening. Despite a dramatic rise
in media coverage of fracking around 2008, the industry actually
moved into more populated states that cover the Marcellus shale
formation (see Figure 1) and calls for stronger oversight are uneven
and have met with correspondingly mixed results. For example, in
spite of the fact that there have been more than 1,000 documented
cases of fracking-related water contamination nationwide,125 many
regions continue to perceive the economic growth potential promised
by gas extraction as outweighing environmental concerns - even in
the currently lax regulatory climate. The rapid pace of expansion in
the region over the Marcellus shale formation has shown no signs
of abating. The few opinion polls that exist also show continued
support for fracking in non-urban Marcellus Shale communities.126
125Lustgarten,

supra note 12.
In a survey of Pennsylvania's 10, Congressional District, which includes Dimock and has amedian per capita income below that of the state, half of surveyed
residents supported increased drilling while only twenty-eight percent thought it
was harmful. David Thompson, Survey' Results Reveal Public Opinion on Gas
Development in the Region, SN
VGAZETTE
(Oct. 7, 2010), http://xxwww.sungazette.
com/page/content.detail/id/554649/Survey-results-reveal-public-opinion-on-gasdevelopment-in-region.html?nav=5011; US. Census Bureau, State & County
Quick Facts, http://quickfacts.census.gov.
At the same time, however, more than half- fifty-seven percent - also
expressed concerns with water contamination, and forty percent expressed health
concerns. David Thompson, Survey Results Reveal Public Opinion on Gas Development in the Region, SUN GAZETTE (Oct. 7, 2010), http://xwww.sungazette.
com/page/content.detail/id/554649/Survey-results-reveal-public-opinion-on-gasdevelopment-in-region.html?nav=5011. Slightly more than seventy percent expected drilling to spur economic development. Id. Eighty percent said that they
were following the issue of shale development closely. Id. In other words, despite
growing public concerns with drilling, majority support for expansion suggests
that certain short-term economic gains ultimately outweigh perceived potential
costs. Id. The survey does not, however, indicate the extent to which residents are
aware of incidents of water contamination in Pennsylvania and beyond, which
could inform the degree to which residents see hydrofracking as harmful. Id.
Results were similar in asurvey of Broome County, New York residents,
where fifty-two to thirty-four percent supported natural gas development. Broome
County's per capita income is below the state median. Genaro C.Armas, Poll:
AMore Than Half of Broome Residents Support Development of Gas Drilling in
126
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Even in New York State, which has been more wary of fracking than
any other state, residents are evenly divided in their support for or
opposition to fracking. Elsewhere, a handful of state assemblies
are considering resolutions calling on Congress not to repeal the
2005 SDWA fracking exemption, professing the procedure to be
safe and critical to economic growth and energy independence>'
State-sponsored initiatives both supporting and opposing regulatory
reform at the federal level are non-binding, and thus largely symbolic.
Bucking the general trend, New York State has taken
substantive steps to slow hydrofracking's advance.129 While the
governor's temporary moratorium technically expired July 1, 2011,
the state is still subject to a de fdcto ban pending the completion
of state regulations, which are expected in 2012.130 The state's
regulations may be completed before the EPA's impact study is
released. Similarly, Governor Chris Christie of New Jersey placed
a one-year moratorium on fracking in that state, though the order is
largely symbolic as New Jersey has very limited recoverable shale
gas. 1' Going further than either state. Governor Martin O'Malley of
Maryland issued an order banning fracking for three years.132
State, Tim ITHACA JOURNAL (Nov. 7, 2010), http:/www.theithacajournal.com/article/20101107/NEWSO/11070353/ Eyes-natural-gas-industry-Pa-Marcellus.
27
1 poll FindsNew Yorkers Dividedon HydraulicFracturingofNaturalGas Wells,
SYRACUSE POST-STANDARD, May 18, 2011, available at http://www.syracuse.com/
news/index.ssf
2011/05/poll finds new yorkers divided.html.
28
1 See supra note 51 (proposed state
resolutions).
29
1 Tom Zeller, New ork Governor etoes FrackingBill, N.Y. TiMEs GREEN
BLOG
(Dec. 11, 2010, 7:35 p.m.), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/11/newyork-governor-vetoes-fracking-bill/?hp.
130 Edward McAllister, Debate on Halting NY FrackingBan Reaches Endgane,
RLUTERS, Nov. 29, 2011, available athttp://xwww.reuters.com/article/ 2011/11/29/
us-fracking-newyork-idUSTRE7AS2QL20111129.
'New Jersey Issues One-ear AMoratorium on Fracking, LEUTERS, Aug. 25, 2011,
available at http://xwww.reuters.com/article/2011/08/25/us-shale-newjerseyidUSTRE7706VN20110825.
Fracking Concerns, FREDERICK NEwS-POST (Dec. 25, 2011), http:x/x/www.fredericknewspost.com/sections/story Tools/print story.htmstorylD=129876&came
FromSection news.
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Yet it is difficult to discern a national trend. Ohio is moving
forward with plans with to exploit its share of the Marcellus shale.13
New York's Governor vetoed a temporary moratorium on fracking
in December 2010, thereby allowing the moratorium to expire in
July 2011 - an unanticipated turn of events in the state that has thus
far been more cautious than any other.14 Former Governor Patterson
explained his change of heart as necessary to avert economic harm
to the state. 135 Hhile only two state legislatures - New Jersey and
Pennsylvania - are considering resolutions calling for a repeal of the
SDWA exemption,"' a growing number ofmunicipalities - including
Pittsburgh and South Fayette, Pennsylvania;13 and Buffalo, New
York13 have decided to ban fracking altogether pending the EPAs
environmental assessment. 39 The Pittsburgh and Buffalo bans are
unlikely to have any immediate impact on gas extraction, considering
difficulties associated with drilling in densely populated urban areas.

133Julie

Carr Smyth, Gas DrillingSurges in Ohio; Brings Jobs, Worries, AssociPREss, Dec. 11, 2011, available at http://news.yahoo.com/gas-drilling-surges-ohio-brings-jobs-worries- 17030 1082.html.
134Zeller, supra note 129.
1 Id. Governor Patterson reflected the priority of economic development over information gathering on fracking's potential risks: "Enacting this legislation would
put people out of work - work that is permitted by the Department of Environmental Conservation and causes no demonstrated environmental harm . . . ."Id
' 6 N.J. Assemb. Res. 112, 214th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2010); P.A. H. Res.
864, 194th Gen. Assemb. (P.A. 2009).
137Zack Needles, Local Drilling Bans Raise Concerns, Energy Lawyers Say,
PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE (Dec. 27, 2010), http://xwww.post-gazette.com/
pg/10361/1113038-499.stm.
'8 Daniel Trotta & Edith Honan, Buffalo, NY Bans HydraulicFracturing,REUTERS,
Feb. 8,2010, available at http://xwww.reuters.com/article /2011/02/08/us-energynatgas-usa-buffalo-idUSNO810753020110208. The Buffalo ordinance also bans
"storing, transferring, treating or disposing of fracking waste within the city." Id.
' PittsburghFirst Pa.City to Ban Gas Drilling, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487036282045756190307584492
48.html.
ATED

246 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

Year

Stories
Containing
"Hydraulic
Fracturing"
or "Hydrofracking"

PA Wells
Drilled
Wells
Drilled*

Using
Hydrofracking

Dt
unavailable
Data

[Vol. 19

Enforcement
Actions: Drilling
Violations by
t.
the PA Dept. of
Enytl. Protect
(DEP)I

2000

8

2001

53Data

2002

13

Dt
unavailable
Data

2003

17

uaai0
unavailable

2004

44

37,239

0

544

2005

46

41,265

0

417

2006

33

47984

0

474

2007

31

49,220

0

470

2008

110

52616

615

599

2009

457

Data
unavaiabe

2,306

628

2010

2,151

Data
aaie
u-navailIablIe

4,064

Data unavailable

2011

6,685

Data
aaie
unavailable

Data
uaaData
unavailable

unavailable

0

Data unavailable

0

Data unavailable

0

Data unavailable
393

unavailable

Figure 1. Hydraulic Fracturing Stories in U.S. Newspapers (Westlaw search
conducted on December 31, 2011). *It is unclear how many of these wells were
drilled using hydraulic fracturing. However, the industry has reported that since
at least 2008, ninety percent of all wells relied on fracking. 140
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In sum, increased reporting and public perceptions of the
risks associated with fracking have inevitably created some degree
of public concern. However, such anxieties have not trumped
perceived economic and energy security benefits, as indicated by
fracking's continued rapid expansion and public support. A lack
of independent scientific, peer-reviewed information on fracking's
health and environmental impacts, combined with the industry's
insistence that the practice is safe, help explain the continued
confidence in the process.

III. POWER AsYMMETRIES BETWEEN LANDOWNERS &

THE GAs

INDUSTRY

Asymmetrical information does not fully explain continued
enthusiasm for fracking. Landowners, even if they are knowledgeable
of fracking's risks or otherwise adhere to the precautionary principle,
also are at a distinct power disadvantage vis-a-vis the gas industry.
In the absence of strong regulations to compensate for differences in
bargaining power., the result is either a real or perceived prisoner's
dilemma. Consider the following hypothetical: Farmer A owns fifty
acres of land, and is surrounded by farmers B, C, and D, each of
xxhom owns between twenty-five and 200 acres of land. All farmers
live atop the gas-rich Marcellus shale formation. One day, the Cleann-Green ("CNG"') gas company approaches fanner A with a lease to
drill for natural gas, which includes an up-front payment of $2,500
per acre and one-eighth royalties for all the gas that is extracted.' 4 '
Aside from the fact that farmer A has happened on hard times and
could use the upfront cash, he also knows that the gas company is
probably offering similar leases to his neighbors. He generally shares
information with some of his neighbors, but does not associate with
others. Farmer A has heard that a hydrofracking operation in the
state next door is suspected of causing aquifer contamination, but
he also knows that his neighbor, farmer B, who owns 100 acres, is
a strong advocate of hydrofracking and also needs the cash. Farmer
A has well water that taps the same aquifer as at least four of his
141Signing bonuses and royalies vary, though this isthe current norm as of Fall
2010.
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neighbors, including farmer B. Unlike his neighbors, farmer A
has an engineering degree, and knows that leaks can occur if the
well cementing is not done properly and if the well pressure is not
correctly monitored. Farmer A also decides that his financial position
is not so tenuous as to justify taking the risk of leasing his land.
Yet he does so anyway. This can be explained by at least
four factors that illustrate asymmetrical legal and economic power
between landowners and the gas industry. First, an up-front financial
offer is analogous to a coercive tender offer in corporate law, and
behavioral economics suggests that reluctant sellers will sell even
if they believe a better offer might come laterl 4 2 This is because
of an implied threat by the purchaser to make a less attractive
offer in the future. Second, the prevailing jurisprudence suggests
that landowners will have, at best, uncertain success with trespass
and nuisance claims. 143 Third, most states have forced pooling
arrangements, which means farmer A might have little to gain - but
a hefty up-front payment to lose - by not leasing. 144 Forced pooling
laws permit a state agency to order a landowner to relinquish his
rights to subsurface minerals if a certain percentage of landowners
atop a contiguous mineral deposit opt to lease their land for mineral
extraction.' Finally, gas leasing in the region may have put farmer
A at a financial disadvantage vis-a-vis other landowners in the area
who have leased.
A. Take it Now or it Might be Gone
Gideon Parchomovsky illustrates the coercive tender offer
analogy in an article describing how a coal company, American
Electric Power ("AEP"), purchased the entire town of Cheshire,
Ohio for much less than it was worth to the company. "'Ina coercive
Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities
and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CAL. L. REv. 75, 89-90 (2004).
143Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza, 268 S.W.3d I (Tex.
2008).
144 Oil and Gas Pooling, OIL + GAs, http://xwww.oil-gas-leases.com/oil-gas-pooling.html (last visited May 15, 2012).
145 38 AM. JUR. Gas and Oil § 180 (2d 2011) (Validity of legislation concerning
pooling or unitization).
46
1 Parch~omov'sky & Siegelman, supranote 142
142
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tender offer scenario. even if a company knows its shares are worth
more than it is offered, the offer to buy immediately induces a
decision to sell at below market value because there is an implied
threat not to buy at all in the future or to buy at a lower price. 47 In
the Cheshire case, while each resident knew that his property was
worth far more to AEP than the company offered, none held out for
a better deal.14 8 Instead, they all sold for fear of being left out at the
back end should their neighbors sign on up-front.149
Similarly, in the above hypothetical, farmer A might fear
that if he declines CNG's offer now, CNG might retract the offer
later. This concern is particularly acute in the unique context of
hydrofracking. Even if farmer A values clean well water more than
the greatest possible financial gain he could extract from CNG. he
knows that, should something go wrong, drilling on his neighbor's
land will impact his water supply as well because they share the
same aquifer. Thus, if farmer A is sophisticated and knowledgeable
about the potential health impacts related to exposure to methane or
fracking fluids - a big "if' in the context of scarce information - he
might also desire a financial cushion in case he or his family falls
ill as a result of contamination. Finally, in the more likely scenario
that farmer A found himself under similar financial pressures as his
neighbors, he would not want to lose out on the opportunity to make
easy money.
B. The Rule of Capture Reigns Supreme
Second, farmer Aknows that CNG could drill a well on farmer
B's land and drain gas from beneath his own without committing an
actionable trespass. That is because of two complementary trends:
(1) recent state court rulings have taken a lessee-friendly view of the
rule of capture when applied to fracking: and (2) courts emphasize
the virtues of maximizing fossil fuel production and minimizing
"'waste. 1 o The common law rule of capture permits a property
47

1

1d at 119.

14 8 1d

149 1d

at 98.
at 120.

0
"See
infra, notes 187-190.
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owner to drill a well on his land and extract as much oil and gas as
the well produces, even if some of those minerals flow from beneath
neighboring properties.1 ' The rule recognizes the fugitive nature of
hydrocarbons - they migrate underground according to geological
conditions - with an eye toward maximizing production.
Having foregone leasing or pooling arrangements, at least
one state would deny farmer A any of the royalties from mineral
extraction beneath his land. In Hegarty v. Board of Oil, Gas &
Mining, the Utah Supreme Court held that a group of landowners
who refused to lease their mineral rights to River Gas Corporation
could not claim retroactive pooling for the minerals drained from
beneath their property from neighboring wells.1 53 The case illustrates
the combined effects of informational and power asymmetries to
disadvantage individual landowners. The court found that even
though the gas company never informed the landowners that there
were other wells in the area and that a large percentage of the
drainage field was beneath their properties, the landowners "knew
their correlative rights [to pool], or at least had notice to inquire after
them," but that they "failed to take action to establish and protect
their own interests."
In addition to losing royalties from gas deposits drained
from his property from a well located on farmer B's land, farmer
A is concerned that with the advent of hydrofracking combined
with horizontal drilling, CNG could place a well pad on farmer B's
property and then drill horizontally beneath his own land. While
current case law is unclear whether the rule of capture applies to
horizontal drilling, there are some indications that courts might find
that it does.
The Texas Supreme Court has set the most recent precedent
on whether hydrofracking may constitute a subsurface trespass. In
''Russell D. Culbertson, Bennion v. Utah State Bd. Of Oil, Gas & Mining: Interpreting the Pooling Provisions of Utah's Oil and Gas Conservation Act, 6 J.
ENERGY L. POL'Y, 219 (1985).
1 See id.
15357 P.3d 1042 (Utah 2002).
154d. at 1050. See lIsU Wiseman, Untested Waters, supIra note Z
53, at 147.
'"Hegarty, 57 P.3d at 1049.
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Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza the court found no actionable
trespass where a vertical drill operation resulted in horizontal
fractures running beneath the respondents' (aggrieved landowners)
land."' It held that the trespass inquiry was intercepted by the rule
of capture. The rule of capture bars liability for "capturing oil or gas
drained from a neighboring property 'whenever such flow occurs
solely through the operation of natural agencies in a normal manner,
as distinguished from artificial means applied to stimulate such a
flow'."1 "The rationale for the rule of capture is the 'fugitive nature
of hydrocarbons.'" 5 8 Respondents therefore argued that the rule of
capture should not apply here because hydraulic fracturing is an
unnatural process, and thus, where fractures extend beneath another's
land, it is an illegal trespass. Natural gas would not have "drained"
from their property had Coastal Oil not caused new fissures deep
underground. Indeed, at the trial phase, the jury determined that
horizontal fractures induced by the pressurized vertical injection of
fracking fluid into the shale formation illegally extended onto the
respondents' land.160
The majority rejected the contention that fissures caused
by fracking are unnatural, thereby finding the rule of capture to
apply. Noting that, as far back as 1962. the Texas Supreme Court
found that salt water injections into a well was not a trespass where the salt water transgressed property lines - it reasoned that
injecting fracking fluid into the ground to induce fissures in shale
was similarly not a trespass.' 6' The court also noted that the drilled
well was bottomed on Coastal's property - not on the respondents'
land. 16 Respondents would have had to claim some injury - such
as damage to their own wells or to the shale formation thousands
of feet below - to show an actionable trespass. 16 3 The court also
268 S.W3d 1,12-13 (Tex. 2008).
Id at 42 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
*Id
9
Id at 13.
161d at 44-45 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
6'Id. at 29 (Willett, J., concurring) (citing R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Manziel, 361
S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962)).
16Id at 13.
'1
16

7
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rejected respondents' analogy of fracking to drilling a deviated
well bottomed on another's property, which would constitute an
actionable trespass.164 The court sidestepped the analogy, looking
not at whether proppant-induced fractures are analogous to a well
bottomed below another's property, but at the remedies available in
each case.'65 "One cannot protect against drainage from a deviated
well by drilling his own well: the deviated well will continue to
produce his gas."6 By contrast, respondents here "may use hydraulic
fracturing to stimulate production from his own wells and drain the
gas to his own property."' 67
The distinction, however, is flawed for two reasons. First,
it is factually dubious. As the dissent noted, the court assumed
the availability of a remedy that might not exist. "[A] fracture's
exposure to the reservoir may be greater than that of the deviated
well and thus drain more gas,"168 thereby rendering fracking
another well on the respondents' land impracticable. Second, the
court's holding frustrates the rationale behind the rule of capture,
and focuses on the remedies available rather than asking whether
an illegal act occurred. The rule is not a wNholesale endorsement of
maximizing subsurface extraction, regardless of whether drainage
occurs from beneath a non-lessor or non-owner's land.169It
is, instead, a recognition that due to pressure, graity., and the
nature of hydrocarbons, one who drills a well legally on his own
land might unwittingly drain minerals from beneath another's
property.170 Holding him liable for trespass would have a chilling
164Id

at 14.

165
Id
166

d

1671d

at 13.

161
Id at 44 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
9
16'
See, e.g., Edwards v. Lachman, 534 P.2d 670, 677 (Okla. 1974) (finding that a
well bottomed beneath anon-lessor's property constituted asubsurface trespass).
170
oThe owner of a tract of land acquires title to the oil and gas which he produces
from wells drilled thereon, though it may be proved that part of such oil or gas
migrated from adjoining lands." Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The
Rule ofCapture- an Oil and Gas Perspective,35 ENVTL. L. REv. 899, 900 (2005)
(quoting Robert L. Hardwicke, The Rule ofCaptur and Its Implications as Applied to Oil and Gas, 13 TEX. L. REV. 391, 393 (1935)).
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effect on resource extraction and result in "waste."
But that is not what happens with fracking. A well is drilled
into shale, and then proppants are injected deep underground,
inducing fractures that spread horizontally. The court implied that
fracking is not an "unnatural" operation like a deviated well by
noting that it is an imprecise operation: a well operator does not
have the same control over the horizontal length or composition of
induced fractures as he does over a deviated well."1 "Frac[k]ing is
required but also imprecise . [W]e are talking about fissures of
immeasurable length and uncontrollable direction. 7 2
But that is not the point. As the dissent opined, a deviated
well is not illegal because it fails to afford property owners a remedy:
it is illegal because, like fracking, "it involve[s] a lease operator's
intentional actions which result in inserting foreign materials without
permission into a second lease, draining minerals by means of the
foreign materials, and 'capturing' the minerals on the first lease." 7
The court's ruling, if followed elsewhere, could make
recovery for trespass difficult even in the case of fracking combined
with horizontal drilling. CoastalOil concerned vertical wells drilled
in 1996 and 1997, before the perfection of horizontal drilling with
fracking. 4 Horizontal drilling allows one well to be substantially
more productive because it extracts gas from a much larger area.
That also means the likelihood of draining from adjoining, nonleased or non-owxned lands increases.
Increased risk of drainage from horizontal drilling creates a
prisoner's dilemma for holdout landowners, who will recognize a
greater risk that their minerals might be taken from them whether
they lease or not. If extractors are protected by the rule of capture,
then landowners might be more likely to lease, knowing they have
no legal recourse under a trespass theory. The court's holding has
171See Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 7.

17Id (Willett, J., concurring).
73
1 1Id at 44 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
74
1 The first horizontal well was used in 1992 in the Barnett Shale around Fort
Worth, and became more prevalent after that. Sarah Hoye & Steve Hargreaves,
Tracking Yields Fuel, Fear in th otrthast, CNN (Sept. 3, 2010), http:/www%1.
cnn.com/2010/US/09/02/fracking/index.html.
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implications in two scenarios involving horizontal drilling: (1)
where a horizontal well is drilled to the edge of the leased property
and proppants induce fractures that cross into the non-leased land,
and (2) where the drill bit actually transgresses property lines.
In the former, the Texas court would almost certainly find no
trespass under a rule of capture theory. Whether the induced fissures
are the result of a vertical well or a horizontal well is irrelevant to a
finding that the fissures themselves do not constitute an actionable
trespass. At least one commentator, Owen L. Anderson, agrees with
this analysis.7 5
The second scenario is more difficult, but it presents a
critical question because the stakes for landowners are higher. On
the one hand, the court's reaffirmation that a deviated well is an
illegal trespass strongly suggests that it would find a horizontally
drilled well beneath non-leased land to be an actionable trespass.
On the other hand - and cautioning against an over reading of the
opinion - there are indications that the entire court, including the
dissent, is flirting with a modification of the long-standing maxim
that "land ownership extends to the sky above and the earth's center
below."1 6 The court never reached the question of whether fracking
can constitute a trespass, finding the question to be intercepted by
the rule of capture. But it stated at the outset that fracking might be
immune, and dropped hints of that in dicta throughout its opinion.
For example, the court found the maxim to be outdated, devised at a
time when its author, Lord Coke, could not have imagined air travel
or gas and oil wells." "We have not previously decided whether
subsurface frac[k]ing can give rise to an action for trespass." 1
Indeed, the court indicated that the depth at which hydraulic
fracturing takes place - many thousands of feet below the surface may affect trespass jurisprudence:
'1 4[1]f a horizontal well were drilled and then hydraulically fractured, resulting
in a trespass of fluids and proppants into neighboring land, I cannot imagine the
mere fact that the well is horizontal, as opposed to vertical, would cause the Texas
Supreme Court to distinguish Garza and find an actionable trespass." Subsurface
"Trespass": AAMan's Subsurface Is Not His Castle, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 247 (Winter 2010).
16C
Oil, 268 S.W3d at 11.

'7 1d at 11-12.

2011-2012]

THE RISE OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING

255

"[F]rom the ancient common law maxim that land
ownership extends to the sky above and the earth's
center below, one might extrapolate that the same
rule should apply two miles below the surface.
But that maxim - cujus est solum ejus est itsque ad
coelum et ad inferos - 'has no place in the mo'ern
world.' Wheeling an airplane across the surface of
one's property without permission is a trespass;
flying the plane through the airspace two miles above
the property is not. Lord Coke, who pronounced the
maxim, did not consider the possibility of airplanes.
But neither did he imagine oil wells. The law of
trespass need no more be the same two miles below
the surface than two miles above." 179
In his concurrence. Justice Willett confronted the
longstanding rule outright, questioning whether a landowner's
rights actually extend below the surface at all."s The court indicated
that a landowner would need to show a surface injury to prevail on
a trespass claim. "Had Coastalcaused something like proppants to
be deposited on the surface of Share thirteen, it would be liable for
trespass."
The dissent similarly decided that common law doctrines of
trespass are malleable in light of overriding public policy concerns
demanding the use of new technologies, such as hydrofracking, to
exploit increasingly difficult-to-access resources.18 2 "Manifestly,
this is an area in which policy decisions predominate and in which
the Legislature and Railroad Commission have the resources and
expertise to provide rules and adjust equities among the various
interests." 1 The same public policy rationale is reflected in one
of the few cases to consider a horizontal drilling trespass claim. In
'7 I1d at 11 (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61n. 5 (1946)).
'80 1d at 29 (Willett, J., concurring).
'IId at 11.
"Id. at 46-47 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1'Id. at 47 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Palmer
Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 231 P.2d 997 (Okla. 1951) (finding that the
rule of capture may be "modified by the State in the exercise of its police powx er").
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Continental Res. v. FarrarOil Co,'84 the North Dakota Supreme
Court found that the regulatory agency's "forced pooling order was
a proper exercise of the state's police power that superseded the
property law of trespass" where a horizontally-drilled well crossed
into a non-leasehold estate.1 15
In other words, the dissent in CoastalOil quarreled with the
majority's interpretation of the common law rule of capture, and
would have decided the trespass issue directly. But it was not closed
to modifjying its longstanding understanding of trespass in light of
current public policy exigencies. The court's invocation of public
policy rationales is not unprecedented. As early as 1962, in Railroad
Commission of Texas v. Mfanziel,18 6 the Texas Supreme Court found
no subsurface invasion of mineral rights when saltwater, which
was injected underground as part of a secondary recovery action,
migrated across property lines. Its ruling was based largely on public
policies favoring extraction:
The orthodox rules and principles applied by the
courts as regards surface invasions of land may not be
appropriately applied to subsurface invasions as arise
out of the secondary recovery of natural resources.
If the intrusions of salt water are to be regarded
as trespassory in character, then under common
184559

N.W2d 841, 844 (N.D. 1997).
In Farrar,the state commission applied traditional forced pooling principles
rooted in a policy rationale of balancing property rights against maximizing production. While forced pooling has long been applicable to vertical wells that drain
from non-leaseholds, here the court did not distinguish the situation where Continental's lateral drill itself crossed into Farrar's mineral estate. Farrar had initially
refused a voluntary pooling offer by Continental, compelling Continental to seek
a compulsory pooling order from the regulating agency, the North Dakota Industrial Commission. Bruce M. Kramer, Poolingfor Horizontal Wells: Can They
Teach an Old Dog New Tricks? 55 ROCKY Mm. MIN. L. INST. 8-3 (2009). To allow
a private party to veto the exercise of the police power by the Commission would
have inhibited the Commission's ability to achieve the strong public policy objective of fostering the efficient development of the state's oil and gas resources. Id.
(referencing a case with similar facts, Egeland v.Continental Resources, Inc., 616
N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 2000)).
186361 S.W2d 560, 566--68 (Tex. 1962)
11
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notions of surface invasions, the justi ing public
policy considerations behind secondary recovery
operations could not be reached in considering the
validity and reasonablenessof such operations."'
The Texas court's willingness to modify common law
trespass rules based largely on public policy rationales mirrors
the evolving jurisprudence in other states. Opinions that favor
producers and reject underground trespass claims are largely
rooted in perceived public policy exigencies. This is even as
courts purport to balance interests of "society and the oil and gas
industry as a whole against the interests of the individual operator
xxho is damaged." 8 As the Texas Court of Appeals noted in 2000
in Browning Oil Co. v. Luecke, "we must attempt to balance two
competing interests. First, we recognize that Lessees should not
be allowed to ignore anti-dilution provisions and exceed pooling
authority with impunity.... On the other hand, we recognize the
immense benefits that have accompanied the advent of horizontal
drilling, including the reduction of waste and the more efficient
recovery of hydrocarbons." 89 Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has invoked the primacy of efficient gas extraction and the
interest of providing uniform statewide regulations in striking down
local laws restricting fracking.19 0 The Colorado Supreme Court has
87
1 Adanziel,

361 S.W2d at 568 (emphasis added); see also CoastalOil, 268 S.W.3d
at 12 (noting that the Adanziel decision "relied heavily on the fact that the [Railroad] Commission had approved the operation").
188Kramer & Anderson, supra note 170, at 155 (quoting Manziel, 361 S.W.2d at
568).
1938 S.W3d 625, 646-47 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
0
19
Range Resources-Appalachia, LLC v. Salem Twp., 964 A.2d 869, 877 (Pa.
2009). In Range Resources, the court found that the comprehensive and restrictive nature of [Salem Township's] regulatory scheme represents an obstacle to the
legislative purposes underlying the [Oil and Gas] Act, thus implicating principles
of conflict preemption. Yet the optimal development of the oil and gas resources
of Pennsylvania is only one of the Oil and Gas Act's four purposes. 58 PA. CONS.
STAr. § 601.102(1) (1984). Two ofthe four purposes favor the rights of individuals
and the environment. One is to protect the safety and property rights of persons
residing in areas where such exploration, development, storage or production occurs. 58 PA. CONs. Smir.§ 601.102(3). The other is to "[p]rotect the natural re-

258 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19

taken a similar approach.191
In sum, "'balancing" the interest of landowners against drillers
increasingly tips in favor of production. If courts continue to either
reformulate the "rule of capture" or endorse a wholesale revision of
settled common law trespass doctrine, then farmer A might find it in
his interest to lease his land regardless of his reservations. If he does
not, he could gain nothing financially and lose his mineral rights by
way of horizontal drilling under his property.
C. Nuisance Actions: Untested Waters
Claims of air and water pollution constitute private nuisance
actions.' 92A landowner whose water is contaminated with methane
or other chemicals could seek damages or even equitable relief if the
contamination is due to fracking. But the legal environment - albeit
an evolving one - is stacked against landowners for two reasons.
First, it is difficult to prove that a fracking operation caused the
contamination. This is largely due to asymmetrical information (See
Part I, supra). Second, the realities of suffering from a continuous
tort like water pollution compels many injured landowners to settle
with gas companies and sign strict non-disclosure agreements.193
The difficulty landowners will have in winning on claims of
fracking-related water contamination illustrate the first point. In the
event that a property owner's water goes bad following a fracking
operation or loses water pressure, the landowner has the burden of
sources, environmental rights and values secured by the Pennsylvania Constitution." 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 601.102(4). See Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough
Council of the Borough of Oaknont, 964 A.2d 855, 863 (Pa. 2009). In THuntley &
untley, the court similarly singled out only one of the Act's purposes as dispositive: "[A] local ordinance may not stand as an obstacle to the execution of the full
purposes and objectives of the Legislature."
191Colo. Mining Ass'n v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 199 P.3d 718, 724 (Colo. 2009)
(citing Voss v. Lundvall Bros., 830 P.2d 1061, 1068 (Colo. 1992) for the proposition that the state's interest in efficient development and production of oil and
gas was sufficiently dominant to override a local ordinance banning the practice).
1 4 J.D. LEE & BARRY LINDmL, MODERN TORT LAw: LIABLITY AND LITIGAFION §
35:1 (2d ed. 2008).
193See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 142, at 110.
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proving that drilling caused the problem in order to secure damages
under a common law nuisance theory. 194 Without a pre-drilling
baseline water quality analysis, it is very difficult to meet that burden.
But baseline water tests are expensive,' 95 and, considering the gas
industry's unequivocal contention that hydrofracking is safe, many
landowners might understandably determine the cost of testing to be
unjustified or prohibitively expensive. While recently filed lawx suits
alleging fracking-related contamination include public and private
nuisance claims, none have thus far been successful.'96
One family in southwestern Pennsylvania has found itself
in this difficult situation.1 9 Not anticipating that gas drilling might
contaminate their water supply, the Hallowiches did not test their
wxater until a year and a half after drilling ended.' 9 8 The tests were
not entirely conclusive, as two different labs gave conflicting results
over the presence of a neurotoxin, acrylonitrile, which may or
may not have been a component of the wastewater pit liner used
by the gas company, Range Resources.'9 The Hallowiches now
194 Wiseman,

supra note 53, at 156.
DIVISION, GUIDELINE FOR
1 (Dec. 2010), available at http://

195WYOMING DEP'T OF ENVTL. QUALITY WATER QUALITY
SAMPLING ANDETESTING WELL WATER QUALITY

region8water.colostate.edu!PDFs/DEQguidelinesshort.pdf.
196See, e.g., Complaint for Berish, et al. v. Southwestern Energy Production Co.,
763 F.Supp.2d 702 (M.D.Pa. Sept. 14, 2010). The lawsuit alleges that the plaintiffs have been exposed to dangerous levels of hazardous chemicals, including
barium, manganese and strontium, as a result of fracking in the area. Id.
197See Lavelle, supra note 78.
198Id As recounted in the National Geographic article, one of the owners, Stephanie Hallowich, was originally unconcerned about the gas operations, because, as
the gas industry proclaims, its mostly "just water and sand" that they're pumping underground. Id. "Roughly 99.5% of the fluids typically used in fracking, the
industry says, are just water and sand, with trace amounts of chemical thickeners,
lubricants and other compounds added to help the process along. The cocktail is
injected thousands of feet below the water table and, the industry argues, can't
possibly be responsible for growing complaints of spoiled streams and wells."
Tom Zeller, E.PA. Considers Risks of Gas Extraction, N.Y. TrIEs (July 23,
2010), http://xwww.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/business/energy-environment/24gas.
html?pagewanted all.
199Lavelle, supranote 78. Range Resources claims that the compound is not used
in their pit liners; the Pennsylvania DLP has suggested that perhaps the contamination came from decorative rocks the Halloxxiches placed near the xxell. lId The
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face an uphill battle to prove that Range Resources polluted their
water with manganese - another potential neurotoxin - which
showed up at several times the permissible level in a DEP test. "
In Pennsylvania, an oil or gas company is presumed responsible for
water contamination where a well is drilled within 1,000 feet of a
water supply, but only if it can be shown within six months after
drilling or completion of the well.20 1
Despite a legal presumption running against lessee gas
drillers, practical barriers make this a weak tool for landowners
wxho discover water contamination after a fracking operation. In the
few lawsuits filed claiming nuisance due to water contamination
from hydrofracking, natural gas companies have claimed that
contamination - usually methane - is naturally occurring.2 0' A Duke
University study has provided the most compelling evidence to
date that hydraulic fracturing results in methane contamination of
drinking water supplies in some areas of the Marcellus formation.20 3
Yet despite conclusive evidence of a correlationbetween fracking
and methane levels, the authors noted that much more research is
needed to establish causation. 04 For example, research is needed
into the mechanism for methane contamination.205
episode illustrates the difficulty a landowner has in proving that a gas company's
operations up to 10,000 feet below the surface polluted well water that is perhaps
a couple hundred feet underground.
200 Id.

58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN §601.208(c) (West 2010) ("Unless rebutted by one
of the five defenses established in subsection (d), it shall be presumed that a well
operator is responsible for the pollution of awater supply that iswithin 1,000 feet
of the oil or gas well, where the pollution occurred within six months after the
completion of drilling or alteration of such well.")
202 See, e.g., Laura Legere, DEP Secretary: No End in Sight ForMethane Leaking into Dinock Water from Gas Wells, SCRANTION TIMES-TRIBUNE (Oct. 2, 20 10),
http: /thetimes-tribune.com/nevws/dep-secretary -no-end-in-sight-for-methaneleaking-into-dimock-water-from-gas-wells- 1.1040814; Marian Wang, EPA Says
Gas Drilling in Texas Contaminated Water and Presents "Threat of Explosion",
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 8, 2010), http:x/x/www.propublica.org/blog/item/epa-say s-methane-contamination-in-texas-presents-threat-of-explosion
203 JACKSON ET AL., supra note 62.
201Id.;

204

See i. at 5.

Id.
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The gas industry has argued persuasively that the thousands
of feet separating the fractured shale formations and drinking-water
wells effectively prevents gas migration, and therefore the fracking
process itself - i.e., breaking open shale irrespective of spills and
leaks above and below ground - does not cause contamination.206
But as the authors of the Duke study note, some areas of the
Marcellus formation are within tectonically active areas with faults,
earthquakes, and sets ofjoints that could be conduits for pressurized
fluid flow.20 Faulty well casings can also cause groundwater
contamination, as occurred in Dimock. 08
Plaintiffs seeking relief under a nuisance theory scored a
minor victory in November 2010. A federal judge in Pennsylvania
refused to throw out a claim by landowners that Cabot Oil & Gas
contaminated their water with methane and hazardous substances
under a strict liability theory. 09 In Pennsylvania, a strict liability
standard is appropriate where the activity is considered intrinsically
hazardous, such that one engaging in the activity is held liable
regardless of precautions taken.20 While the judge emphasized
that a full factual record was necessary to determine whether strict
liability should apply to fracking, it suggests the possibility that
plaintiffs will not bear the burden of proving causation and other
factors necessary to win on nuisance and negligence theories.
Even if plaintiffs can show causation, the expense of
litigation and living with a continuous tort compels many to settle
and sign non-disclosure agreements. Oftentimes the lease agreement
itself includes a non-disclosure provision. " The necessity of getting
e.g., HydraulicFracturingFluids, EQT, http://xwww.eqt.com/ production!
fluids.aspx (last visited May 15, 2012).
207 JACKSON ET AL., supra note 62, at 3.
208 Jon Campbell, EPA Considers Using Dimock, Pa. for Case Study, PRESSCONNECTS.COM (Jan. 7, 2011), http:Awww.pressconnects.com /articled20110107/
VEWS01/101070383.
29
0 Fiorentino v.Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 750 F.Supp.2d 506 (M.D.Pa. Nov.15,
2010).
206See,

210

d.

Bob Fife, Letter to the Editor, DrillingHas a Cost, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE
OPiN LETTERs BLuG (June 16, 2010, 00:18), http://blogs.sites.post-gazette.com
index.php/opinion/open-letters/189 14-drilling-has-a-cost.
211
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financial assistance for clean water or fears of future health injuries
due to pollution can dissuade potential plaintiffs from pursuing
costly and time-consuming litigation to show culpability, particularly
wx
here the outcome is highly uncertain.212
In short, absent stronger rules governing fracking, and
better enforcement of those rules, private landowners are in a weak
position to hold lessees accountable. The Coasian notion that private
bargaining through nuisance actions can more effectively abate
pollution than public regulation fails. Ronald Coase theorized that
pollution is a private bargaining problem rather than a regulatory
problem. With the protection of common law nuisance claims,
an aggrieved party will negotiate with the polluter for a mutually
beneficial solution.213 The polluter will either pay the victim an
amount that covers the damage to the victim, or will stop polluting
in exchange for a payment from the victims. But this assumes that
transaction costs are low, and in the case of a continuous tort like
water pollution, those costs can be very high.114 A person who
lacks a basic necessity like clean water likely lacks the resources,
willpower, or time to engage in drawn-out negotiations or litigation
with the polluter, and may instead accept whatever offer the polluter
puts forward - such as paid shipments of clean water. In return,
the polluter escapes culpability, can continue asserting that there
have been no cases of fracking-related pollution, and proceed with
business-as-usual. Indeed, this scenario was borne out in Dimock,
Pennsylvania, where residents recently agreed to a $4.1 million
settlement for clean water from Cabot Oil & Gas, despite concerns
by landowners that this amount was inadequate to compensate their
financial, health, and environmental losses.215

See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 142, at 110-111. ("The constant
fear and inconvenience Cheshire residents experienced made them largely indifferent to how much they could get by holding out" and not selling to AEP by
instead seeking damages or an injunction under anuisance claim.)
213Ronald H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 11, 19 (1960);
see also Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supranote 142, at 94.
214
Parchomovsky, supra note 142, at 94.
21
Hurdle, supranote 93; Bateman, supranote 90.
212
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Thus, nuisance actions may not be practical for two
reasons: (1) their success is highly uncertain, particularly amidst
asymmetrical information between victims and gas companies; and
(2) the reality of a continuous tort like fracking might dissuade a
victim from pursuing costly and time-consuming litigation. Time
will tell whether new lawsuits that include nuisance actions are
viable in redressing individual harms associated with fracking.
D. Forced Pooling Can Incentivize Leasing
While Pennsylvania has no compulsory pooling statute,
most states have forced pooling laws.216 These statutes delegate to
state regulatory commissions the state's police power to require
non-consenting mineral rights holders to permit drilling beneath
their property. " In other words, if multiple property owners sitting
atop a contiguous mineral estate or unit cannot agree to pool their
subsurface mineral rights and divide up the royalties, the state can
force all landowners to do so. Courts have upheld compulsory
pooling laws in the face of constitutional takings challenges if such
schemes permit all mineral interest owners to participate in mineral
production."' If farmer A lived in one of those states, he would be
compelled to relinquish his exclusive rights to his natural gas mineral
estate. While he would receive a share of the royalties from any
extraction under his property, he would forego the upfront payment
by the gas industry, which, in this example would be substantial:
$2,500/acre x 50 acres = $125,000.

216

Oil and Gas Pooling,

OIL-GAs-LEASES.COM,

http://""www.oil-gas-leases.com/oil-

gas-pooling.html (last visited May 15, 2012).
Culbertson, supranote 151, at 225-26. The Utah Supreme Court in Bennion v.
Utah State Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining found a "vested right to some compensation"
as being "essential to prevent the regulatory legislation from unconstitutionally
depriving the nonconsenting mineral owner of his property without compensation." 675 P.2d 1135, 1142 (Utah 1983). In other words, a state does not deprive
a mineral rights holder of due process so long as anly regulatory pooling arrangement compensates the landowxner for his share of the mineral estate.
218
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Pennsylvania is currently considering a forced pooling
initiative, the "Conservation Pooling Act."2 Forced pooling creates
different incentives depending on howx the lawx is wvritten. On the
one hand, the advent of horizontal drilling with fracking makes
it more likely that a non-leasing landownei will find his mineials
extracted -without his consent -via a neighboring leasehold. If
Pennsylxvania courts go the wxay of North Dakota, wxhich, under
Farrarand Egeland, found no trespass where a lateial drill bit itself
crossed into a non-leasehold mineral estate under a forced pooling
arrangement, then landowvners would see a substantial diminution
of their pioperty rights)20 Farmer A might be moie inclined to lease
than if forced pooling were not permitted, knowing that if any of his
neighbors leased, his minerals might be taken anyxay. Thus, farmer
A might as well lease his land and extract the upfront signing bonus.
Moreover, if farmer A did lease, he could demand an antidilution proxision included inhis lease. Anti-dilution clauses state
that at least a certain peicentage, say sixty peicent, of any pooled
unit come from the lessor's mineral estate. Thus, xeven if the courts
in farmer A's state favored landowvner rights and found a trespass
where a drill bit actually crossed into a non-leased estate, they likely
would uphold a forced pooling arrangement wxahere only the resulting
fractures crossed into non-leasehold properties. 2 2
Laura Legere, "Forced Pooling" Legislation Planned for Gas Industry in
Pennsylvania, SCRANTION TIMES-TRIBLNE (July 11, 2010), http://thetimes-tribune.
corninewxs/forced-pooling-legislation-for-gas-industry -planned-in-pennsylIvamna1.885341.
0
22 Continental Resources, Inc. v. Farrar Oil Co., 559 N.W2d 841, 844-45 (N.D.
1997); Egeland v. Flying J Oil & Gas, Inc., 616 N.W.2d 861, 863 (N.D. 2000).
219

221BRUCE M. KRuMER, POOLING FOR HORIZONTAL WELLS. CAN THEY TEACH AN OLD

§ 8.03, available at http://xwww.colorado.edu/1awnrlc/events!
documents/shaleplays/60%20-% 20Kramer% 20-% 20presentation[1I].pdf; see also
Browxnint Oil Co. v. Luecke, 38 S.W.3d 625, 637 (Tex. App. 2000) (considering a
pooling conuract with the provision that if any pooleu unit is created
0
wnith respect
to any wel drilled on the land covered hereby, at least sixty percent (600) of such
pooled unit shall consist of the land covered hereby.")
22 See supra notes 187-190. The Texas Supreme Court has come to such a conclusion even absent any pooling arrangement. Moreover, courts, including those in
Pennsylvania, routinely note the legislature's emphasis on maximizing extraction
and reducing wxaste as justifications for favoring lessees' interests over lessors
DOG NEW TRICKs?,
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On the other hand, the absence of forced pooling might
incentivize fanner A to lease where he otherwise would not have.
This is in light of the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Coastal
Oil that, if followed elsewhere, presents a scenario in which a
landowner's minerals might be drained legally via the rule of capture
due to a horizontal drilling operation bottomed on a neighboring
mineral estate. In that case, if his minerals were not pooled, farmer
A would get nothing: no upfront payment and no royalties. If
his mineral rights were pooled, he would at least receive royalty
payments. Thus, if farmer A is averse to leasing his land for drilling,
but would tolerate the attendant land disturbances necessary to set up
a well pad and containment pond if it meant the difference between
receiving and not receiving any royalty payments for his minerals,
then he might lease only in the absence of a forced pooling order.
E. Gas Drilling Can Bring Financial Gain & Loss
Finally, consider farmer A's choice if he was not in a
relatively stable financial position. The entrance of the natural
gas industry can eliminate this hard choice by allowing farmers
to retain their land while offering them a chance to join the
middle class. Gas companies bring jobs to communities and
quick financial gain to landowners. As one resident of Dimock,
Pennsylvania, said: "This is a poor area. Ehis is the perfect place
to come in and drill. A lot of guys didn't have work. Now they're
driving trucks. The bars are hopping, the rentals are full."2
Similarly, businesses in Washington County, Pennsylvania, are
property rights.
22 Kramer, supra note 221, at § 8.01[2]. Indeed, pooling regulations were adopted
to address some of the negative consequences of the rule of capture, which incentivized mineral estate holders to drill feverishly as close to property lines as
possible to drain minerals from its non-leasehold before owners of those leaseholds could drill their own wells. Pooling arrangements were intended to help balance property rights interests against those of maximizing extraction and reducing
waste.
224 Leslie Stahl, Energy: The Pros and Cons of Shale Gas Drilling, 60 MI NUTES (Nov. 15, 2010), http://.'www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/11/12/60minutes!
main704 8737page4.shtml?tag= contentMain; contentBody.
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benefitting from an influx of gas drilling workers while lessors
collect royalties.
But there is also a more slowly developing cost side to the
economic coin. The rapid expansion of gas drilling is sapping land
values in two ways. First, some properties are decreasing in value
due to hydrofracking-related pollution. That is what happened to
the Hallowiches, whose house and rural farmland property is now
worth much less than before a massive gas compressor station, gas
conditioning facility, and wastewater pit were located on and around
their property. 26 "Our house and property are worth nothing," says
Stephanie Hallowich." Similarly, the value of Steve and Elizabeth
Mobaldi's Colorado ranch was compromised when a drilling well
on their neighbor's property exploded, spewing fracking fluid across
their land and forcing the Mobaldi's to evacuate. " While there is
a lack of empirical evidence comparing the number of property
owners who have profited from fracking with the number who have
suffered financial loss as a result, it is clear that fracking is not a
clear economic winner or loser.
Second, increasing competition for traditional agricultural
jobs is driving up costs for food producers. Turning the industry's
argument that the gas boom is a savior for economically distressed
farmers on its head,230 this phenomenon could force landowners
to consider leasing, even if they resisted doing so in the past.
Dairy distributors are requiring higher hauling fees from dairy
farmers, noting that the gas boom has increased their labor costs.
As distributors like Land-O-Lakes lose truck drivers to Marcellus
Laura Legere, PA Communities Changed By Natural Gas Drilling Offer Lessons, SCRANTON TIMES-TRIBUNE (June 23, 2010), http://thetimes-tribune.com/
new s/w estern-pa-communities-changed-by -natural-gas-drilling-offer-local-lessons-1.860440#axzz1l7qDaP4bm.
226 Lavelle, supra note 76.
225

227Id.
8

Bette Hileman, Balancing Energy Needs and Safety, Cimm. ENG. NEws (Feb.
11, 2008), available at http:/.pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/cen-v086n006.p038.
229 See, e.g., Hoye & Hargreaves, supra note 174.
230 Justin Head, Area Farms Hurting from Marcellus Shale Boom, HORNELL
LVENING TRIBUNE (Nov. 18, 2010), http://wx.eveningtribune.com/ features!
xl 51217655/Area-farms-hurting-from-Marcellus-Shale-boom.
22
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shale drillers, they are forced to pay their drivers higher wages.
While truckers get increased wages, producers feel the squeeze
as distributors, like Land-O-Lakes, increase their hauling fees to

compensate.' 31
So if farmer A makes a product that he sells beyond
the local food stand, he likely pays a distributor to bring it to retail.
If distributors' trucking costs increase due to competition from the
gas boom, then farmer A pays the price in higher hauling fees. As a
result, a decision to lease his land for gas production might suddenly
look like the only way to retain his farming business. Further study
is needed to assess the economic winners and losers in communities
impacted by fracking.
Therefore, whether he finds himself in financial straits or not,
fanner A has strong motivations to lease for at least six reasons: (1)
even ifhe does not lease, farmerA is likely to suffer the environmental
and health consequences of his neighbors' decision to lease: (2)
evolving case law that considers subsurface trespass claims tends to
favor extractors; (3) the success and feasibility of nuisance claims are
highly uncertain; (4) courts persistently emphasize the public policy
values of reducing waste and maximizing oil and gas production; (5)
xxhere forced pooling laws exist, farmer A may be forced to permit
extraction anyway; and (6) fracking has mixed economic effects
on landowners. When these incentives are combined with a lack of
general information on the risks of fracking (see Part 1I.B, supra),
farmer A would rationally see his choice framed squarely in terms
of financial gain and loss. In such a scenario, a decision to lease is
preferable.
CONCLUSION
Asymmetrical information and power between individual
landowners and the natural gas industry helps to explain general
enthusiasm for fracking, despite indications that it poses significant
public health and environmental risks. Critics of this view may argue
that there are other motivations outside the realm of behavioral law
and economics that explain a broad embrace of fracking, such as
231 d
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securing energy independence, combating climate change, and
rehabilitating struggling communities. That may well be true. But
the law and economics perspective helps to explain widespread
willingness to lease land for fracking despite both the salience and
frequency of documented health and environnental impacts. The
experiences of Dish and Argyle, Texas: Dimock, Pennsylvania: and
other towns where fracking occurs suggest that knowledge is critical
to landowner decision making, particularly absent strong regulatory
regimes. Moreover, even where landowners do know the risks
involved, evolving state lawx jurisprudence suggests that individual
landowners are hard-pressed to win relief by bringing nuisance and
trespass claims.
In any event, such relief is entirely retrospective and does
not prevent health and environmental injuries. The need is clear
for sensible municipal, state, and federal regulation. In the absence
of reasonable rules, municipalities might be in the best position to
effect change quickly. Indeed, there are signs that local governments
are seeking to regulate hydraulic fracturing within their borders.1
But sensible regulatory reform necessitates rigorous, independent,
and scientifically-based information. That may come with the EPA's
ongoing study, due out in 2012. In the meantime, the precautionary
principle should govern local, state, and federal policymaking to
mitigate asymmetries in information and bargaining power between
landowners and industry.

232 See

e.g., Kyle Lawson, Communities Forced To Create Guidelines For Poten-

tial Marcellus Shale Drilling, YOL

NORTH HILLS (Nov. 11, 2010), http://x
www.

yournorthhills.cominorthhillsnews/article/communities-forced-create-guidelines-potential-marcellus-shale-diilling (Pine and Hampton Townships xre considering zoning fracking and Richiand banned drilling on residential land).

